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Abstract
Game theory is usually di¢ cult to test precisely in the eld because predictions typically
depend sensitively on features that are not controlled or observed. We conduct one such
test using eld data from the Swedish lowest unique positive integer (LUPI) game. In the
LUPI game, players pick positive integers and whoever chose the lowest unique number
wins a xed prize. Theoretical equilibrium predictions are derived assuming Poisson-
distributed uncertainty about the number of players, and tested using both eld and
laboratory data. The eld and lab data show similar patterns. Despite various deviations
from equilibrium, there is a surprising degree of convergence toward equilibrium. Some
of the deviations from equilibrium can be rationalized by a cognitive hierarchy model.
jel classification: C72, C92, L83, C93.
keywords: Population uncertainty, Poisson game, guessing game, experimental meth-
ods, behavioral game theory, level-k, cognitive hierarchy.
1 Introduction
Game theory predictions are challenging to test with eld data because those predictions
are usually sensitive to details about strategies, information and payo¤s which are di¢ cult
to observe in the eld. As Robert Aumann pointed out: In applications, when you want
to do something on the strategic level, you must have very precise rules...An auction is a
beautiful example of this, but it is very special. It rarely happens that you have rules like
that (cited in van Damme, 1998, p. 196).
In this paper we exploit such a happening, using eld data from a Swedish lottery
game. In this lottery, players simultaneously choose positive integers from 1 to K. The
winner is the player who chooses the lowest number that nobody else picked. We call
this the LUPI game, because the lowest unique positive integer wins.1 Because strategies
and payo¤s are known, the eld setting is unusually well-structured compared to other
strategic eld data on contracting, pricing, entry, information disclosure, or auctions. The
price one pays for clear structure is that the game does not very closely resemble any other
familiar economic game. Gaining structure at the expense of generality is similar to the
tradeo¤ faced in using data from game shows and sports to understand general strategic
principles.
This paper analyzes LUPI theoretically and reports data from the Swedish eld lottery
and from parallel lab experiments. The paper has several theoretical and empirical parts.
The parts have a coherent narrative ow because each part raises some new question which
is answered by the next part. The overarching question, which is central to all empirical
game theory, is this one: What strategic models best explain behavior in games?
The rst specic question is Q1: What does an equilibrium model of behavior predict
in these games? To answer this question, we rst note that subjects do not know exactly
how many other players are participating in the game and that the actual number of
1The Swedish company called the game Limbo, but we think LUPI is more mnemonic, and more apt
because in the typical game of limbo, two players who tie in how low they can slide underneath a bar do
not lose.
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players varies from day to day. We therefore approximate the equilibrium by applying the
theory of Poisson games.2 In Poisson games, the number of players is Poisson-distributed
(Myerson, 1998).3 Remarkably, assuming a variable number of players rather than a xed
number makes computation of equilibrium simpler if the number of players is Poisson-
distributed.
The number of players in the Swedish LUPI game actually varies too much from day-
to-day to match the cross-day variance implicit in the Poisson assumption. However,
the Poisson-Nash equilibrium is (probably) the only computable equilibrium benchmark.
Field tests of theory always violate some of the assumptions of the theory, to some degree;
it is an empirical question whether the equilibrium benchmark ts reasonably well despite
resting on incorrect assumptions. (We revisit this important issue in the conclusion after
all the data are presented.)
After deriving the Poisson equilibrium in order to answer Q1, we compare the Poisson
equilibrium to the eld data. In our view, the equilibrium is surprisingly close (given its
complexity and counterintuitive properties). However, there are clearly large deviations
from the equilibrium prediction and some behaviorally interesting ne-grained deviations.
These empirical results raises question Q2: Can non-equilibrium behavioral models explain
the deviations when the game is rst played?
The simple LUPI structure allows us to provide tentative answers to Q2 by comparing
Poisson-Nash equilibrium predictions with predictions of a particular parametric model of
boundedly rational play: the level-k or cognitive hierarchy (CH) approach. CH predicts
too many low-number choices (compared to the Poisson-Nash), capturing some deviation
of the eld data.
Because the LUPI game is simple, it is easy to go a step further and run a lab experi-
ment that matches many of the key features of the game played in the eld. The lab data
2As Milton Friedman (1953) famously noted, theories with false assumptions could often predict well
(and, in economics, often do).
3This also distinguishes our paper from contemporaneous research on unique bid auctions by Eich-
berger and Vinogradov (2008), Gallice (2009), Raviv and Virag (2009), Rapoport, Otsubo, Kim and Stein
(2009) and Houba, van der Laan and Veldhuizen (2010) which all assume that the number of players is
xed and commonly known.
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enable us to address one more question: Q3: How well does behavior in a lab experiment
designed to closely match features of a eld environment parallel behavior in the eld?
Q3 is important because of an ongoing debate about lab-eld parallelism in economics,
rekindled with some skepticism by Levitt and List, 2007 (see Falk and Heckman, 2009
and Camerer, 2010 for replies). We conclude that the basic empirical features of the lab
and eld behavior are comparable. This close match adds to a small amount of evidence
of how well experimental lab data can generalize to a particular eld setting when the
experiment was specically intended to do so.
The ability to track decisions by each player in the lab also enables us to answer some
minor questions that cannot be answered by eld data. For example, it appears that
players tend to play recent winning numbers more, sociodemographic variables do not
correlate strongly with performance, and there are not strong identiable di¤erences in
skill across players (measured by winning frequency).
Before proceeding, we mention an important caveat. LUPI was not designed by the
lottery creators to be an exact model of a particular economic game. However, it combines
some strategic features of interesting naturally-occurring games. For example, in games
with congestion, a players payo¤s are lower if others choose the same strategy. Examples
include choices of tra¢ c routes and research topics, or buyers and sellers choosing among
multiple markets. LUPI has the property of an extreme congestion game, in which having
even one other player choose the same number reduces ones payo¤to zero.4 Indeed, LUPI
is similar to a game in which being rst matters (e.g., in a patent race), but if players
are tied for rst they do not win. One close market analogue to LUPI is the lowest
unique bid auction (LUBA; see Eichberger and Vinogradov, 2008, Gallice, 2009, Raviv
and Virag, 2009 , Rapoport et al., 2009, and Houba et al., 2010). In these auctions,
an object is sold to the lowest bidder whose bid is unique (or in some versions, to the
highest unique bidder). LUPI is simpler than LUBA because winners do not have to pay
4Note, however, that LUPI is not a congestion game as dened by Rosenthal (1973) since the payo¤
from choosing a particular number does not only depend on how many other players that picked that
number, but also on how many that picked lower numbers.
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the amount they bid, and there are no private valuations and beliefs about valuations of
others. However, LUPI contains the same essential strategic conict: between wanting to
choose low numbers and wanting to choose unique numbers.
Finally, the scientic value of LUPI games is like the scientic value of data from game
shows and professional sports, such as Deal or No Deal(e.g. Andersen, Harrison, Lau
and Rutström, 2008 and Post, van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler, 2008). Like the
LUPI lottery, game shows and sports are not designed to be replicas of typical economic
decisions. Nonetheless, game shows and sports are widely studied in economics because
they provide very clear eld data about actual economic choices (often for high stakes),
and they have simple structures that can be analyzed theoretically. The same is true for
LUPI.
The next section provides a theoretical analysis of a simple form of the LUPI game,
the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. Section 3 reports the basic eld data and compare them
to the Poisson-Nash approximate benchmark. It also introduces the cognitive hierarchy
behavior model and asks whether it can explain the eld data. Section 4 describes the lab
replication. Section 5 concludes the paper. Supporting material is available in a separate
Online Appendix.
2 Theory
In the simplest form of LUPI, the number of players, N , has a known distribution, the
players choose integers from 1 to K simultaneously, and the lowest unique number wins.
The winner earns a payo¤ of 1, while all others earn 0.5
Werst analyze the game when players are assumed to be fully rational, best-responding,
and have equilibrium beliefs. We assume that the number of players N is a random vari-
5In this stylized case, we assume that if there is no lowest unique number then there is no winner.
This simplies the analysis because it means that only the probability of being unique must be computed.
In the Swedish game, if there is no unique number then the players who picked the smallest and least-
frequently-chosen number share the top prize.
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able that has a Poisson distribution.6 The Poisson assumption proves to be easier to
work with than a xed N , both theoretically and computationally. The actual variance
of N in the eld data is much larger than in the Poisson distribution so the Poisson-Nash
equilibrium is only a computable approximation to the correct equilibrium. Whether it
is a good approximation will partly be answered by looking at how well the theory ts
the eld data.7 In addition, we implement the Poisson distribution of N exactly in lab
experiments.
2.1 Properties of Poisson Games
In this section, we briey summarize the theory of Poisson games developed by Myerson
(1998, 2000). The theory is then used in the next section to characterize the Poisson-Nash
equilibrium in the LUPI game.
Games with population uncertainty relax the assumption that the exact number of
players is common knowledge. In particular, in a Poisson game the number of players N
is a random variable that follows a Poisson distribution with mean n. We have
N  Poisson(n) : N = k with probability e
 nnk
k!
and, in the case of a Bayesian game (or the cognitive hierarchy model developed below),
players types are independently determined according to the probability distribution
r = (r(t))t2T on some type space T . Let a type prole be a vector of non-negative integers
listing the number of players of each type t in T , and let Z (T ) be the set of all such type
proles in the game. Combining N and r can describe the population uncertainty with
the distribution y  Q(y) where y 2 Z (T ) and y(t) is the number of players of type
t 2 T .
6Players did not know the number of total bets in both the eld and lab versions of the LUPI game.
Although players in the eld could get information about the current number of bets that had been made
so far during the day, players had to place their bets before the game closed for the day and therefore
could not know with certainty the total number of players that would participate in that day.
7For small N , we show in Online Appendix A that the equilibrium probabilities for xed-N Nash and
Poisson-Nash equilibrium are practically indistinguishable (Figure A1).
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Players have a common nite action space C with at least two alternatives, which
generates an action prole Z(C) containing the number of players that choose each action.
Utility is a bounded function U : Z(C)  C  T ! R, where U(x; b; t) is the payo¤ of a
player with type t, choosing action b, and facing an opponent action prole of x. Let x(c)
denote the number of other players playing action c 2 C.
Myerson (1998) shows that the Poisson distribution has two important properties that
are relevant for Poisson games and simplify computations dramatically. The rst is the
decomposition property, which in the case of Poisson games imply that the distribution of
type proles for any y 2 Z (T ) is given by
Q(y) =
Y
t2T
e nr(t)(nr(t))y(t)
y(t)!
:
Hence, ~Y (t), the random number of players of type t 2 T , is Poisson with mean
nr(t), and is independent of ~Y (t0) for any other t0 2 T . Moreover, suppose each player
independently plays the mixed strategy , choosing action c 2 C with probability (cjt)
given his type t. Then, by the decomposition property, the number of players of type
t that chooses action c, Y (c; t), is Poisson with mean nr(t)(cjt) and is independent of
Y (c0; t0) for any other c0; t0.
The second property of Poisson distributions is the aggregation property, which states
that any sum of independent Poisson random variables is Poisson distributed. This prop-
erty implies that the number of players (across all types) who choose action c, ~X(c), is
Poisson with mean
P
t2T nr(t)(cjt), independent of ~X(c0) for any other c0 2 C. We refer
to this property of Poisson games as the independent actions (IA) property.
Myerson (1998) also shows that the Poisson game has another useful property: envi-
ronmental equivalence (EE). Environmental equivalence means that conditional on being
in the game, a type t player would perceive the population uncertainty as an outsider
would, i.e., Q(y). If the strategy and type spaces are nite, Poisson games are the only
games with population uncertainty that satisfy both IA and EE (Myerson, 1998). EE is
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a surprising property.
Take a Poisson LUPI game with 27 players on average. In our lab implementation, a
large number of players are recruited and are told that the number of players who will be
active (i.e. play for real money) in each period varies. Consider a player who is told she
is active. On the one hand, she might then act as if she is playing against the number
of opponent players that is Poisson-distributed with a mean of 26 (since her active status
has lowered the mean of the number of remaining players). On the other hand, the fact
that she is active is a clue that the number of players in that period is large, not small.
If N is Poisson-distributed the two e¤ects exactly cancel out so all active players in all
periods act as if they face a Poisson-distributed number of opponents. EE, combined with
IA, makes the analysis rather simple.
An equilibrium for the Poisson game is dened as a strategy function  such that every
type assigns positive probability only to actions that maximize the expected utility for
players of this type; that is, for every action c 2 C and every type t 2 T ,
if (cjt) > 0 then U(cjt; ) = max
b2C
U(bjt; )
for the expected utility
U(bjs; ) =
X
x2Z(C)
Y
c2C

e n(c)(n(c))x(c)
x(c)!

U(x; b; s)
where
(c) =
X
t2T
r(t)(cjt)
is the marginal probability that a random sampled player will choose action c under
. Note that this equilibrium is by denition symmetric; asymmetric equilibria where
players of the same type could play di¤erently are not dened in games with population
uncertainty since ex ante we do not know the list of participating players.
Myerson (1998) proves existence of equilibrium under all games of population uncer-
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tainty with nite action and type spaces, which includes Poisson games.8 This existence
result provides the basis for the following characterization of the Poisson-Nash equilib-
rium.
2.2 Poisson Equilibrium for the LUPI Game
In the (symmetric) Poisson equilibrium, all players employ the same mixed strategy p =
(p1; p2;    ; pK) where
PK
i=1 pi = 1. Let the random variable X(k) be the number of
players who pick k in equilibrium. Then, Pr(X(k) = i) is the probability that the
number of players who pick k in equilibrium is exactly i. By environmental equivalence
(EE), Pr(X(k) = i) is also the probability that i opponents pick k. Hence, the expected
payo¤s for choosing di¤erent numbers are:
(1) = Pr(X(1) = 0) = e np1
(2) = Pr(X(1) 6= 1)  Pr(X(2) = 0) =  1  np1e np1  e np2
(3) = Pr(X(1) 6= 1)  Pr(X(2) 6= 1)  Pr(X(3) = 0)
...
(k) =
 
k 1Y
i=1
Pr(X(i) 6= 1)
!
 Pr(X(k) = 0)
=
 
k 1Y
i=1

1  npie npi
!  e npk
for all k > 1. If both k and k+ 1 are chosen with positive probability in equilibrium, then
(k) = (k + 1). Rearranging this equilibrium condition implies
enpk+1 = enpk   npk: (1)
8For innite types, Myerson (2000) proves existence of equilibrium for Poisson games alone.
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Alternatively, this condition can be written as
pk   pk+1 =   1
n
ln(1  npke npk): (2)
In addition to condition 1 (or 2), the probabilities must sum up to one and the expected
payo¤ from playing numbers not in the support of the equilibrium strategy cannot be
higher than the numbers played with positive probability.
The three equilibrium conditions allows us to characterize the equilibrium and show
that it is unique.
Proposition 1 There is a unique mixed equilibrium p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) of the Poisson
LUPI game that satises the following properties:
1. Full support: pk > 0 for all k.
2. Decreasing probabilities: pk+1 < pk for all k.
3. Convexity/concavity: (pk+1 pk+2) > (pk pk+1) for pk+1 > 1=n, and (pk+1 pk+2) <
(pk   pk+1) for 1=n > pk.
4. Convergence to uniform play with many players: for any xed K, n ! 1 implies
pk+1 ! pk.
5. Probability asymptotes to zero with more numbers to guess: for any xed n, K !1
implies pK ! 0.
Proof. We rst prove the ve properties and then prove that the equilibrium is
unique.
1. We prove this property by induction. For k = 1, we must have p1 > 0. Otherwise,
deviating from the proposed equilibrium by choosing 1 would guarantee winning for
sure. Now suppose that there is some number k+1 that is not played in equilibrium,
but that k is played with positive probability. We show that  (k + 1) >  (k),
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implying that this cannot be an equilibrium. To see this, note that the expressions
for the expected payo¤s allows us to write the ratio  (k + 1) = (k) as
 (k + 1)
 (k)
=
Pr(X(k + 1) = 0) Qki=1 Pr(X(i) 6= 1)
Pr(X(k) = 0) Qk 1i=1 Pr(X(i) 6= 1)
=
Pr(X(k + 1) = 0)  Pr(X(k) 6= 1)
Pr(X(k) = 0)
:
If k+ 1 is not used in equilibrium, Pr(X(k+ 1) = 0) = 1, implying that the ratio is
above one. This shows that all integers between 1 and K are played with positive
probability in equilibrium.
2. Rewrite condition (1) as
enpk+1   enpk =  npk:
By the rst property, both pk and pk+1 are positive, so that the right hand side is
negative. Since the exponential is an increasing function, we conclude that pk >
pk+1.
3. Condition (2) can be re-written as
pk   pk+1 =   1
n
ln (1  f(npk)) (3)
where f(x) = xe x, f 0 (x) = (1  x) e x and x = npk. Hence, f 0(x) > 0 if x < 1,
and f 0(x) < 0 if x > 1. If pk+1 > 1n , by the second property, npk > npk+1 > 1. So,
f(npk+1) > f(npk). It follows that
(pk+1   pk+2) =   1
n
ln(1  f(npk+1)) >   1
n
ln(1  f(npk)) = (pk   pk+1):
If pk < 1n , by the second property, npk+1 < npk < 1. So, f(npk+1) < f(npk). Thus,
(pk+1   pk+2) =   1
n
ln(1  f(npk+1)) <   1
n
ln(1  f(npk)) = (pk   pk+1):
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4. Taking the limit of (2) as n!1 implies that pk+1 = pk.
5. Since 1 =
PK
k=1 pk > K  pK by the second property, we have pK < 1K ! 0 as
K !1.
In order to show that the equilibrium p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) is unique, suppose by con-
tradiction that there is another equilibrium p0 = (p01; p
0
2;    ; p0K). By the equilibrium
condition (1), p1 uniquely determines all probabilities p2; :::; pK , while p01 uniquely deter-
mines p02; :::; p
0
K . Without loss of generality, we assume p
0
1 > p1. Since in any equilibrium,
pk+1 is strictly increasing in pk by condition (1), it must be the case that all positive
probabilities in p0 are higher than in p. However, since p is an equilibrium,
PK
k=1pk = 1.
This means that
PK
k=1p
0
k > 1, contradicting the assumption that p
0 is an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for the results in Proposition 1 are as follows. For the rst property,
rst note that if k is chosen, so is k + 1, since deviating from k to k + 1 would otherwise
be protable. Nothing matters if there is a smaller number than k uniquely chosen by
an opponent, but if not, picking k wins only if nobody else chooses k, while picking
k + 1 wins if either nobody chooses k or if more than two opponents choose k. Together
with the fact that 1 has to be chosen guarantees full support. Secondly, lower numbers
should be chosen more often because the LUPI rule favors lower number. For example, if
everyone is choosing uniformly, you should pick 1. However, as more people participate
in the game, this advantage disappears which implies convergence to uniform (property
4).9 Thirdly, condition 2 shows that the di¤erence between pk and pk+1 solely depends
on the function f(x) = xe x where x = npk. Since f 0(x) > 0 if x < 1, and f 0(x) < 0 if
x > 1, the critical cuto¤ for concavity/convexity happens at pk = 1=n. Lastly, since pK is
the smallest among all probabilities, if pK does not converge to zero as K becomes large,
the probabilities will not sum up to one.
9For example, when K = 100 and n = 500 the mixture probabilities start at p1 = 0:0124 and end with
p97 = 0:0043; p98 = 0:0038; p99 = 0:0031; p100 = 0:0023; so the ratio of highest to lowest probabilities is
about six-to-one. When K = 100 and n = 5; 000, all mixture probabilities for numbers 1 to 100 are 0:01
(up to two-decimal precision).
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In the Swedish game the average number of players was n = 53; 783 and number choices
were positive integers up to K = 99; 999. As Figure 1 shows, the equilibrium involves
mixing with substantial probability between 1 and 5500, starting from p1 = 0:0002025.
The predicted probabilities drop o¤ very sharply at around 5500. This is due to the
concavity/convexity switch around 1=n, which happens at T = 5513 (pT = 0:00001857);
the di¤erence (pk   pk+1) increases as you move toward 1=n from either side. Figure
1 shows only the predicted probabilities for 1 to 10,000, since probabilities for numbers
above  = 5518 are positive but minuscule. Note that n = 53; 783 < K = 99; 999 implies
that K=n > 1, and hence, the concavity/convexity switch (and the sharp drop) has to
occur at T < K.10
The central empirical question that will be answered later is how well actual behavior in
the eld matches the equilibrium prediction in Figure 1. Keep in mind that the simplied
game analyzed in this section di¤ers in some potentially important ways from the actual
Swedish game. Computing the equilibrium is complicated and its properties are not
particularly intuitive. It might therefore be surprising if the actual data matched the
equilibrium closely. Because there are 49 days of data, we can also see whether choices
move in the direction of the Poisson-Nash benchmark over time.
3 The Field LUPI Game
The eld version of LUPI, called Limbo, was introduced by the government-owned Swedish
gambling monopoly Svenska Spel on the 29th of January 2007. This section describes its
essential elements; additional description is in Online Appendix C.
In Limbo, players chose an integer between 1 and 99,999. Each number bet costs 10
SEK (approximately 1 EURO). The game was played daily and the winning number was
presented on TV in the evening and on the Internet. The winner received 18 percent of the
10pT is close to 1=n by the concavity/convexity switch. So, T is positively related to n. Since pK
converges to zero for large K due to Property 5 of Proposition 1, T does not depend on K as long as K
is large (and non-binding).
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total sum of bets, with the prize guaranteed to be at least 100,000 SEK (approximately
10,000 EURO). If no number was unique the prize was shared evenly among those who
chose the smallest and least-frequently chosen number. There were also smaller second
and third prizes (1000 SEK and 20 SEK) for being close to the winning number.
During the rst three to four weeks, it was only possible to play the game at physical
branches of Svenska Spel by lling out a form (Figure A11 in the Online Appendix). The
form allowed players to bet on up to six numbers11, to play the same numbers for up to 7
days in a row, or to let a computer choose random numbers for them (a HuxFluxoption).
During the following weeks it was also possible to play online, see Online Appendix C for
a description of the online interface.
Daily data were downloaded for the rst seven weeks, ending on the 18th of March
2007. The game was stopped on March 24th, one day after a newspaper article claimed
that some players had colluded in the game, but it is unclear whether collusion actually
occurred or how it could be detected.
Unfortunately, we have only gained access to aggregate daily frequencies, not to
individual-level data. We also do not know how many players used the randomization
HuxFlux option. However, because the operators told us how HuxFlux worked, we can
estimate that approximately 19 percent of players were randomizing in the rst week.12
Note that the theoretical analysis of the LUPI game in the previous section di¤ers
from the eld LUPI game in three ways. First, the theory used a tie-breaking rule in
which nobody wins if there is no uniquely chosen number (to simplify expected payo¤
calculations enormously). In the eld game, however, players who tie by choosing the
smallest and least-frequently chosen number share the prize. This is a minor di¤erence
because the probability that there is no unique number is very small and it never happened
during the 49 days for which we have data. A second, more important, di¤erence is that
11The rule that players could only pick up to six numbers a day was enforced by the requirement that
players had to use a gamblers card linked to their personal identication number when they played.
Colluding in LUPI can conceivably increase the probability of winning but would require a remarkable
degree of coordination across a large syndicate, and is also risky if others collude in a similar way.
12In the rst week, the randomizer chose numbers from 1 to 15,000 with equal probability. The drop
in numbers just below and above 15,000 suggests the 19 percent gure.
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we assume that each player can only pick one number. In the eld game, players are
allowed to bet on up to six numbers. This does play a role for the theoretical predictions,
since it allows players to coordinate ones guesses to avoid choosing the same number more
than once (as could be the case when each bid is placed by a di¤erent player). Finally,
we do not take the second and third prizes present in the eld version into account, but
this is unlikely to make a big di¤erence given the strategic nature of the game.
Nevertheless, these three di¤erences between the payo¤ structures of the game an-
alyzed theoretically, and the eld game as it was played, are a motivation for running
laboratory experiments with single bets, no opportunity for direct collusion, and only a
rst prize, which match the game analyzed theoretically more closely.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the rst 49 days of the game. Two additional
columns display the corresponding daily averages for the rst and last weeks to see how
much learning takes place. The last column displays the corresponding statistics that
would result from play according to the Poisson equilibrium.
Overall, the average number of bets N was 53,783, but there was considerable varia-
tion over time. There is no apparent time trend in the number of participating players,
but there is less participation on Sundays and Mondays (see Figure A2 in the Online Ap-
pendix).13 The variation of the number of bets across days is therefore much higher than
what the Poisson distribution predicts (its standard deviation is 232). However, note that
larger variance in N means sometimes there are many fewer players (so chosen numbers
should be smaller) and sometimes there are many more players (so chosen numbers should
be larger). Fixing the mean of N and increasing the variance might therefore have little
overall impact on the equilibrium number distribution (and has little e¤ect in the lab data
reported later).
13The Sunday-Monday average N (std. dev.) is 44; 886 (4001) and the Tuesday-Saturday average is
57; 341(5810). Dividing the sample in this way does reduce the variance in N by almost half. However,
the summary statistics in the two groups are very close together (the means are 2792 and 2941).
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Despite some di¤erences between the simplied theory and the way the eld lottery
game was implemented, the average number chosen overall was 2835, which is close to
the equilibrium prediction of 2595. The mean number in the last week is 2484, compared
to the prediction of 2595.14 The median converged toward the equilibrium prediction of
2542, from 1204 in the rst week to 1936 in the last week. Winning numbers, and the
lowest numbers not chosen by anyone, also varied a lot over time.
In equilibrium, the rst and foremost prediction is that essentially nobody (fewer
than 0.01 percent) should choose a number above T = 5513. In the eld lottery game, 20
percent chose these high numbers in the rst week, but in the last week only 2.8 percent
did. For numbers above 10,000, 12 percent chose these extremely high numbers in the rst
week, but in the last week only 1 percent did. This indicates both compelling convergence,
as well as initial deviation. In fact, the third quartile (75%) was 7610 in day 1, but quickly
dropped below 3200, resulting in an average of 3779 for week 1 and 2443 for week 2. Then,
the third quartile converged back toward the equilibrium prediction (3901), ending up at
3137 in week 7. All other aggregate statistics in Table 1 are closer to the equilibrium
predictions in the last week than in the rst week. Many of the statistics converge rather
swiftly and closely. For example, although 20 percent chose numbers above T = 5513 in
week 1, less than 5 percent did each day from week 3 to 7.15
An interesting feature of the data is a tendency to avoid round or focal numbers and
choose quirky numbers that are perceived as anti-focal (as in hide-and-seek games,
see Crawford and Iriberri, 2007a). Even numbers were chosen less often than odd ones
(46.75% vs. 53.25%). Numbers divisible by 10 are chosen a little less often than predicted.
14To judge the signicance of the di¤erence between theory and data we simulated 1000 weekly average
numbers from the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. That is, 7  53; 783 i.i.d. draws were drawn from the
equilibrium distribution and the average number was computed. This yields one simulated average. The
procedure was then repeated a total of 10; 000 times to create 10; 000 simulated averages. The low and
high range of 9500 of these simulated averages a 95% condence interval is 2590 to 2600. Since the
weekly averages in the data lie outside this extremely tight interval, we can conclude that the data are
signicantly di¤erent than those predicted by theory. But note that this is an extremely demanding test
because the very large sample sizes mean that the data must lie very close to the theory to not reject the
theory.
15Figure A3 (in Online Appendix) provides weekly boxplots of the data and Figure A4 plots average
daily frequencies for week 1, 3, 5, and 7 for those who are interested in weekly changes in the distribution
and percentiles.
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All days 1st week 7th week Eq.
Avg. Std. Min Max Avg. Avg. Avg.
# Bets 53783 7782 38933 69830 57017 47907 53783
Average number played 2835 813 2168 6752 4512 2484 2595
Median number played 1675 348 436 2273 1204 1936 2542
Winning number 2095 1266 162 4465 1159 1982 2595
Lowest number not played 3103 929 480 4597 1745 3462 4938
Above T = 5513 (%) 6.65 6.24 2.56 30.32 20.11 2.80 0.00
First (25%) quartile 780 227 66 1138 425 914 1251
Third (75%) quartile 2898 783 2130 7610 3779 3137 3901
Below 100 (%) 6.08 4.84 2.72 2.97 15.16 3.19 2.02
Below 1000 (%) 32.31 8.14 21.68 63.32 44.91 27.52 20.03
Below 5000 (%) 92.52 6.44 68.26 96.74 78.75 96.44 93.32
Below 10000 (%) 96.63 3.80 80.70 98.94 88.07 98.81 100.00
Even numbers (%) 46.75 0.58 45.05 48.06 45.91 47.45 50.00
Divisible by 10 (%) 8.54 0.466 7.61 9.81 8.43 9.01 9.99
Proportion 19002010 (%) 71.61 4.28 67.33 87.01 79.39 68.79 49.78
11, 22,...,99 (%) 12.2 0.82 10.8 14.4 12.39 11.44 9.09
111, 222,...,999 (%) 3.48 0.65 2.48 4.70 4.27 2.78 0.90
1111, 2222,...,9999 (1/1000) 4.52 0.73 2.81 5.80 4.74 3.95 0.74
11111, 22222,...,99999 (1/1000) 0.76 0.84 0.15 5.45 2.26 0.21 0
Proportion of numbers between 1900 and 2010 refers to the proportion relative to numbers between
1844 and 2066. 11, 22,...,99refers to the proportion relative to numbers below 100, 111,222,...,999
relative to numbers below 1000, and so on. The Eq. Avg.predictions refers to the prediction of the
Poisson-Nash equilibrium with n = 53; 783 and K = 99; 999.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and Poisson-Nash equilibrium predictions for eld LUPI
game data
Strings of repeating digits (e.g., 1111) are chosen too often. Players also overchoose
numbers that represent years in modern time (perhaps their birth years). If players had
played according to equilibrium, the fraction of numbers between 1900 and 2010 divided
by all numbers between 1844 and 2066 should be 49.78 percent, but the actual fraction
was 70 percent.16
Figure 2 shows this focality in a histogram of numbers between 1900 and 2010 (ag-
gregating all 49 days). Note that although the numbers around 1950 are most popular,
16We compare the number of choices between 1900 and 2010 to the number of choices between 1844
and 2066 since there are twice as many strategies to choose from in the latter range compared to the
rst. If all players randomized uniformly (an approximation to the equilibrium strategy with large n and
K), the proportion of numbers between 1900 and 2010 would be about 50 percent.
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there are noticeable dips at focal years that are divisible by ten.17 Figure 2 also shows
the aggregate distribution of numbers between 1844 and 2066, which clearly shows the
popularity of numbers around 1950 and 2007. There are also spikes in the data for special
numbers like 2121, 2222 and 2345. Explaining these focalnumbers with the cognitive
hierarchy model presented below is not easy (unless the 0-step player distribution is de-
ned to include focality), so we will not comment on them further (see Crawford and
Iriberri, 2007a for a successful application in simpler hide-and-seek games).
3.2 Results
Do subjects in the eld LUPI game play according to the Poisson-Nash equilibrium bench-
mark? In order to investigate this, we assume that the number of players is Poisson
distributed with mean equal to the empirical daily average number of numbers chosen
(53; 783). As noted previously, this assumption is wrong because the variation in number
of bets across days is much higher than what the Poisson distribution predicts.
Figure 3 shows the average daily frequencies from the rst week together with the
equilibrium prediction (the dashed line), for all numbers up to 99,999 and for the re-
stricted interval up to 10,000. Recall that in the Poisson-Nash equilibrium, probabilities
of choosing higher numbers rst decrease slowly, drop quite sharply at around 5500, and
asymptotes to zero after p5513  1=n (recall Proposition 1 and Figure 1). Compared to
equilibrium, there is overshooting at numbers below 1000, undershooting at numbers be-
tween 2000 and 5500, and again overshooting beyond 5500.18 It is also noteworthy how
spiky the data is compared to the equilibrium prediction, which is a reection of clustering
on special numbers, as described above.
Nonetheless, the ability of the very complicated Poisson-Nash equilibrium approxima-
17Note that it would be unlikely to observe these dips reliably with typical experimental sample sizes.
It is only with the large amount of data available from the eld (2.5 million observations) that these dips
are visually obvious and di¤erent in frequency than neighboring unround numbers.
18This overshooting-undershooting-overshooting pattern could explain why in Table 1, the average
number played is close to the equilibrium prediction, while the rst quartile and median are always too
low (though converging up) and the percentage above 5513 is always too high.
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tion to capture some of the basic features of the data is surprisingly good. For example,
most of the guesses (79.89% in the rst week) are concentrated at or below T = 5513. As
a referee nicely expressed this central result: To me, the truncation of the distribution
(i.e., the set [T,K] has negligible mass) is the rst-order e¤ect of equilibrium reasoning.
Furthermore, the relationship between k, K and T is not obvious so the nding that, by
the 7th week, almost all of the mass of the empirical distribution is concentrated in [0,T]
is quite striking.
Figure 4 shows average daily frequencies of choices from the second through the last
(7th) week. Behavior in this period is closer to equilibrium than in the rst week. In
particular, the overshooting of high numbers almost vanishes only 4.41% of the choices
are above 5513. However, when only numbers below 10,000 are plotted, the overshooting
of low numbers and undershooting of intermediate numbers is still clear (although the
undershooting region shrinks to numbers between 4000 and 5500) and there are still
many spikes of clustered choices.
The rst three columns of Table 2 provide the frequencies for the last week of eld data
(Figure A4 in the Online Appendix) with a bin size of 500 up to number 5500 and compare
it with the Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction. The 2 test statistic is 53864:6, strongly
rejecting the equilibrium model. This suggests that although there is only substantial
undershooting in the last three bins, the data from the nal week is still far from the
Poisson-Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the drop from around 43; 000 (in the rst four bins)
to around 30; 000 (in the next four bins) is also di¢ cult to account for.
Nevertheless, given there are so much data, it is not surprising that the equilibrium
model is rejected. One possible remedy is to use the average number of guesses for each
number (in the bin range), instead of the total number of guesses. This is done by simply
dividing the bin totals by 500. We then round these numbers into integers so we can
perform a 2 test (like for the total number of guesses). The results are shown in column
4 and 5 of Table 2. The 2 test statistic is 107:6, still rejecting the equilibrium model,
but much smaller than that of the total.
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Week 7 vs. Equilibrium Week 7 vs. Cognitive Hierarchy
Total frequency Average frequency Total frequency Average frequency
(for all numbers) (for each number) (for all numbers) (for each number)
Bin range Week 7 Eq. Week 7 Eq. Week 7 CH Week 7 CH
1  500 47047 33796.5 94 67.6 47047 43538.8 94 87.1
501 1000 45052 33448.3 90 66.9 45052 42641.2 90 85.3
1001 1500 41489 33060.8 83 66.1 41489 42343.9 83 84.7
1501 2000 43815 32624.0 88 65.2 43815 41257.8 88 82.5
2001 2500 33827 32123.5 68 64.2 33827 39631.4 68 79.3
2501 3000 29850 31537.8 60 63.1 29850 36794.6 60 73.6
3001 3500 33115 30832.0 66 61.7 33115 32437.4 66 64.9
3501 4000 25765 29943.8 52 59.9 25765 25532.5 52 51.1
4001 4500 16810 28745.2 34 57.5 16810 16006.9 34 32.0
4501 5000 6614 26891.5 13 53.8 6614 6401.8 13 12.8
5001 5500 2463 22130.7 5 44.3 2463 2075.7 5 4.2
2 53864.6*** 107.6*** 2891.4*** 5.66
*=10 percent, **=5 percent and ***=1 percent signicance level.
Table 2: Frequency table for the last week of eld data, the Poisson-Nash equilibrium and
cognitive hierarchy model
The top panel of Table 3 provides additional weekly goodness-of-t measures for the
Poisson-Nash equilibrium. Weekly 2 test results are shown in the rst two rows. In
particular, the 2 test statistics drop sharply from more than 640 in the rst week to less
than 110 in the last week. Nevertheless, the equilibrium prediction is rejected at the 0:1
percent level for all weeks.
Another possibility is to calculate the proportion of the empirical density that lies
below the predicted density. This measure is one minus the summed miss rates, the
di¤erences between actual and predicted frequencies, for numbers which are chosen more
often than predicted. In Table 3, the percentage of empirical data that lies below equi-
librium density is reported in the third row, increasing from just below 50 percent in the
rst week to more than 75 percent in the last week.
Finally, when all models are not literally true, one can compare models using the
equivalent number of observations (ENO) of the relevant model computed from raw
mean squared errors. ENO was rst proposed by Erev, Roth, Slonim and Barron (2007)
to compare relative performance of di¤erent learning models (that were all rejected) pre-
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dicting subject behavior in games with mixed strategy equilibria, a similar situation to
what we have here. Roughly speaking, ENO represents the weight one should put on the
model relative to the existing data when predicting new observations. As stated in Erev
et al. (2007), the ENO of the model is the value of N (the size of the experiment) that is
expected to lead to a prediction that is as accurate as the models prediction.As shown
in the fourth row of Table 3, the ENO of the Poisson-Nash equilibrium increases from
about 2; 200 in week 1 to almost 14; 000 in week 7, demonstrating the improvement of
equilibrium from week 1 to 7.19
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Poisson-Nash equilibrium
2(for average frequency) 640.45 323.76 257.42 259.27 261.19 121.29 107.60
(Degree of freedom) ***(10) ***(10) ***(10) ***(10) ***(10) ***(10) ***(10)
Proportion below (%) 48.95 61.29 67.14 67.44 69.93 76.25 76.23
ENO 2176.4 4964.4 6178.4 7032.4 8995.0 14056.8 13879.3
Cognitive hierarchy model
Log-likelihood -53740 -31881 -22085 -19672 -19496 -19266 -17594
 1.80 3.17 4.17 4.64 5.02 6.76 6.12
 0.0034 0.0042 0.0058 0.0068 0.0069 0.0070 0.0064
2(for average frequency) 77.92 52.21 7.64 3.90 4.60 4.64 5.48
(Degree of freedom) ***(9) ***(9) (8) (8) (8) (9) (9)
Proportion below (%) 62.58 72.57 78.65 80.17 82.09 82.43 82.24
ENO 3188.8 7502.5 9956.0 12916.1 17873.0 21469.6 21303.0
*=10 percent, **=5 percent and ***=1 percent signicance level.
The degree of freedom for a 2 test is the number of bins minus one.
The proportion below the theoretical prediction refers to the fraction of the empirical density that
lies below the theoretical prediction.
Table 3: Goodness-of-t for Poisson-Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy for eld
data
The next question is whether an alternative theory can explain both the degree to
which the equilibrium prediction is surprisingly accurate and the degree to which there
is systematic deviation.
19However, since there are on average 47; 907 ( 335; 347=7) guesses every day in week 7, even an ENO
of 14,000 can still be easily outweighed by one day of data.
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3.3 Rationalizing Non-Equilibrium Play
A natural way to model limits on strategic thinking is by assuming that di¤erent players
carry out di¤erent numbers of steps of iterated strategic thinking in a cognitive hierarchy
(CH). This idea has been developed in behavioral game theory by several authors (e.g.,
Nagel, 1995, Stahl andWilson, 1995, Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta, 2001, Camerer,
Ho and Chong, 2004 and Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) and applied to many games
of di¤erent structures (e.g., Crawford, 2003, Camerer et al., 2004, Crawford and Iriberri,
2007b and Ellingsen and Östling, 2010).20
One alternative candidate to cognitive hierarchy would be the quantal response equilib-
rium (QRE). QRE and CH have been compared to Nash predictions in many experimental
studies, and they often explain deviations from Nash equilibrium in similar ways (e.g.,
Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer, 2009). However, QRE and CH can be clearly distinguished
in LUPI games since QRE seems to predict too few low-number choices. For example,
for n = 26:9 players and number choices from 1 to K = 99 (as implemented in our lab
experiment), Figure 5 shows a 3-dimensional plot of the QRE probability distributions
for many values of , along with the Poisson-Nash equilibrium.21 When  is low, the
distribution is approximately uniform. As  increases more probability is placed on lower
numbers 1-12. When  is high enough the QRE closely approximates the Poisson-Nash
equilibrium, which puts roughly linear declining weight on numbers 1 to 15 and innites-
imal weight on higher numbers. We therefore focus on a cognitive hierarchy model in this
paper.
Level-k and cognitive hierarchy models require a specication of how k-step players
behave and the proportions of players for various k. We follow Camerer et al. (2004) and
assume that the proportion of players that do k thinking steps is Poisson distributed with
20A precursor to these models was the insight, developed much earlier in the 1980s by researchers
studying negotiation, that people often ignore the cognitions of othersin asymmetric-information bidding
and negotiation games (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore and Valley, 2000).
21The plot shows the QRE based on a power function, but the picture looks identical with a logit
function.
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mean  , i.e., the proportion of players that think in k steps is given by
f (k) = e  k=k!:
We assume that k-step thinkers incorrectly believe that all other players can only think
fewer steps than themselves, but correctly guess the proportions of players doing 0 to
k   1 steps (as a truncated Poisson distribution). In other words, level-1 thinkers believe
all other players are level-0 types. Level-2 thinkers believe there are level-0 types and
level-1 types. Level-3 thinkers believe there are level-0, level-1 and level-2 types, and so
on.22 Then the conditional density function for the belief of a k-step thinker about the
proportion of l < k step thinkers is
gk (l) =
f (l)Pk 1
h=0 f (h)
:
The IA and EE properties of Poisson games (together with the general type speci-
cation described earlier) imply that the number of players that a k-step thinker believes
will play strategy i is Poisson distributed with mean
nqki = n
k 1X
j=0
gk (j) p
j
i .
Hence, the expected payo¤ for a k-step thinker of choosing number i is
k(i) =
i 1Y
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
 e nqki :
To t the data well, it is necessary to assume that players respond stochastically (as
in QRE) rather than always choose best responses (see also Rogers et al., 2009).23 We
22An alternative approach which often has advantages is that level-k types think all other players are
exactly level (k   1). However, this does not work in LUPI games: If we start out with L0 types playing
random, L1 types should all play 1. If L2 types believe there are only L1 types, they should never play
1. If L3 types best respond to only L2 types, then they should all play 1 (since they believe nobody is
playing 1), and this logic will continue to cycle.
23The CH model with best-response piles up most predicted responses at a very small range of the
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assume that level-0 players randomize uniformly across all numbers 1 to K, and higher-
step players best respond with probabilities determined by a normalized power function
of expected payo¤s.24
The probability that a k step player plays number i is given by
pki =
Qi 1
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
e nq
k
i

PK
l=1
Qi 1
j=1
h
1  nqkj e nq
k
j
i
e nql
 ;
for  > 0. Since qkj is dened recursively it only depends of what lower step thinkers
do it is straightforward to compute the predicted choice probabilities numerically for
each type of k-step thinker (for given values of  and ) using a loop, then aggregating
the estimated pkk across steps k. Apart from the number of players and the number of
strategies, there are two parameters: the average number of thinking steps,  , and the
precision parameter, .
Figure 6 shows the prediction of the cognitive hierarchy model for the parameters of
the eld LUPI game, i.e., when n = 53; 783 andK = 99; 999. The dashed line corresponds
to the case when players do relatively few steps of reasoning and their responses are very
noisy ( = 1:80 and  = 0:0034). The dotted line corresponds to the case when players do
more steps of reasoning and respond more precisely ( = 6:12 and  = 0:0064). Increasing
 and  creates a closer approximation to the Poisson-Nash equilibrium, although even
with a high  there are too many choices of low numbers.
Can the cognitive hierarchy model account for the main deviations from equilibrium
lowest integers (1-step thinkers choose 1, 2-step thinkers choose 2, and k-step thinkers will never pick
a number higher than k). Assuming quantal response smoothes out the predicted choices over a wider
number range.
24In many previous studies logit choice functions are typically used and they t comparably to power
functions (e.g., Camerer and Ho, 1998 for learning models). Some QRE applications have used power
functions and found better ts (e.g., in auctions, Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2002). However, in this case
a logit choice function ts substantially worse for the eld data (with 99,999 numbers to choose from).
The reason is that logit choice probabilities are convex in expected payo¤. This implies, numerically that
probabilities are either substantial for only a small number of the 99,999 possible numbers, or are close to
uniform across numbers. The logit CH model simply cannot t the intermediate case in which thousands
of number are chosen with high probability and many other numbers have very low probability (as in the
data).
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described in the previous section? The bottom panel of Table 3 reports the results from
the maximum likelihood estimation of the data using the cognitive hierarchy model.25 The
best-tting estimates week-by-week, shown in the last two rows of Table 3, suggest that
both parameters increase over time. The average number of thinking steps that people
carry out,  , increases from about 1:8 in the rst week an estimate in line with estimates
from 1.0 to 2.5 that typical t experimental data sets well (Camerer et al., 2004) to 6
in the last week.
Figure 7 shows the average daily frequencies from the rst week together with the
CH estimation and the equilibrium prediction. The CH model does a reasonable job of
accounting for the over- and undershooting tendencies at low and intermediate numbers
(with the estimated ^ = 1:80). In later weeks, the week-by-week estimates of  drift
upward a little (and  increases slightly), which is a reduced-form model of learning as an
increase in the mean number of thinking steps. In the last week the cognitive hierarchy
prediction is much closer to equilibrium (because  is around 6) but is still consistent
with the smaller amounts of over- and undershooting of low and intermediate numbers
(see Figure 8).
To get some notion of how close to the data the tted cognitive hierarchy model is,
the bottom panel of Table 3 displays several goodness-of-t statistics. First, the log-
likelihoods reveal that the cognitive hierarchy model does better in explaining the data
toward the last week and is always much better than Poisson-Nash.26 However, as shown
in the right panel of Table 2, though predictions of the cognitive hierarchy model are
much closer to the data than that of equilibrium, the large number of observations simply
forces the 2 test to reject the model, even when we bin 500 numbers into one category.
In particular, the last week 2 test statistic for the cognitive hierarchy model is 2891:4,
25It is di¢ cult to guarantee that these estimates are global maxima since the likelihood function is
not smooth and concave. We also used a relatively coarse grid search, so there may be other parameter
values that yield slightly higher likelihoods and di¤erent parameter values.
26Since the computed Poisson-Nash equilibrium probabilities are  for k > 5518, the likelihood is
always essentially zero for the equilibrium prediction. In Online Appendix B, however, we compute the
log-likelihood for the low numbers only. Based on the Schwarz (1978) information criterion, the cognitive
hierarchy model still performs better in all weeks.
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much smaller than that of equilibrium (53864:6), but still at an extremely high level of
signicance.
As discussed above, one remedy is to consider rounded averages for each bin. This
is reported in the last two columns of Table 2. The last week 2 test statistic is 5:66,
implying that the prediction is not statistically di¤erent from the cognitive hierarchy
prediction. Since there is one cell that has a predicted value less than ve, it might
not be appropriate to conduct a 2 test including that cell. Hence, the bottom panel of
Table 3 reports weekly 2 test results that focus on only the bins that have a predicted
value greater than 5. The second column of the bottom panel provides the number of
bins used, and the rst column reports 2 test statistics. As can be seen, the cognitive
hierarchy model is still strongly rejected in the rst two weeks, though not as strongly as
equilibrium, but not in the following weeks.
Two other measures of goodness-of-t previously discussed are computed, in order to
compare the CH model with the equilibrium prediction. In particular, the proportion of
the empirical density that lies below the predicted density is reported in third row of the
bottom panel (in Table 3). The cognitive hierarchy model does better than the equilibrium
prediction in all seven weeks based on this statistic. For example, in the rst week, 63
percent of playerschoices were consistent with the cognitive hierarchy model, whereas 49
percent were consistent with equilibrium. However, both models improve substantially
across the weeks. On the other hand, weekly ENO is calculated and reported in the fourth
row of the bottom panel (in Table 3). Again, the cognitive hierarchy model does better
in all seven weeks, starting from around 3200 in the rst week and end up at 21; 000 in
the nal two.27
In conclusion, the cognitive hierarchy model performs better than the Poisson-Nash
equilibrium in all seven weeks of data regardless of what measure is used, explaining the
systematic deviation from equilibrium. In particular, the cognitive hierarchy model can
rationalize the tendencies that some numbers are played more, as well as the undershooting
27Again, since the total number of guesses in week 7 is 335,347, even though the CH model has a much
higher ENO than Poisson-Nash equilibrium, it also can be easily outweighed by merely one day of data.
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below the equilibrium cuto¤. The value-added of the cognitive hierarchy model is not
primarily that it gives a slightly better t, but that it provides a plausible story for how
players manage to play so close to equilibrium.28
4 The Laboratory LUPI Game
We conducted a parallel lab experiment for two reasons.
First, the rules of the eld LUPI game do not exactly match the theoretical assump-
tions used to generate the Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction. In the eld data some
choices were made by a random number generator, some players might have chosen mul-
tiple numbers or colluded, there were multiple prizes, and the variance in N is larger than
the Poisson distribution variance.
In the lab, we can more closely implement the assumptions of the theory. If the theory
ts poorly in the eld and closely in the lab, then that suggests the theory is on the right
track when its underlying assumptions are most carefully controlled. If the theory ts
closely in both cases, this suggests that the additional factors in the eld that are excluded
from the theory do not matter. If the theory ts both well, but slightly better in the lab,
this is also reassuring since it indicates the additional factors in the eld contributed
merely noise.
Second, because the eld game is rather simple, it is possible to design a lab experiment
which closely matches the eld in its key features. How closely the lab and eld data
match provides some evidence in ongoing debate about how well lab results generalize to
comparable eld settings (e.g., Levitt and List, 2007 and Falk and Heckman, 2009).
28Nonetheless, one might wonder whether the parameter-free Poisson-Nash equilibrium does worse
than cognitive hierarchy merely because the latter has two parameters. We address this issue in Online
Appendix B by estimating the Poisson-Nash equilibrium model week-by-week to obtain the the best n
(mean of the Poisson distribution) that minimizes mean squared error instead of maximizing empirical
likelihood. As shown in Table A3, the estimated Poisson-Nash model still performs worse than the
cognitive hierarchy model in week 1-5, but catches up and is comparable to cognitive hierarchy in week
6 and 7. Nevertheless, to make this prediction, the estimated n have to be much lower than the actual n
and it is not clear how such incorrect beliefs could be sustained.
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In designing the laboratory game, we compromise between two goals: to create a
simple environment in which theory should apply (theoretical validity), and to recreate
the features of the eld LUPI game in the lab (specialized external validity). Because
we use this opportunity to create an experimental protocol that is closely matched to
a particular eld setting, we often sacriced theoretical validity in favor of close eld
replication.
The rst choice is the scale of the game: The number of players (N), possible number
choices (K), and stakes. We choose to scale down the number of players and the largest
payo¤ by a factor of 2000. This implies that there were on average 26.9 players and the
prize to the winner in each round was $7. We scaled down K by a factor of 1000 since
K = 99 allows for focal numbers such as 66, 77, 88, and 99 to be chosen, and the shape of
the equilibrium distribution has some of the basic features of the equilibrium distribution
for the eld data parameters (e.g. most numbers should be below 10 percent of K). Since
the eld data span 49 days, the experiment also has 49 rounds in each session. (We
typically refer to experimental rounds as daysand seven-dayintervals as weeksfor
semantic comparability between the lab and eld descriptions.)
The number of players in each round was drawn from a distribution with mean 26.9.
In three of the four sessions, subjects were told the mean number of players, and that
the number varied from round to round, but did not know the distribution (in order to
match the eld situation in which players were very unlikely to know the total number
playing each day). Due to a technical error, in these three sessions, the variance was
lower than the Poisson variance (7.2 to 8.6 rather than 26.9). However, this mistake is
likely to have little e¤ect on behavior because subjects only know the winning number in
each round and can draw little inference about the underlying distribution of the number
of players. In the last session, the number of players in each round was drawn from a
Poisson distribution with mean 26.9 and the subjects were informed about this (Figure
A5 in the Online Appendix). Furthermore, the data from the true Poisson session and
the lower-variance sessions look statistically similar so we pool them for all analysis (see
27
below).
Some design choices made the lab setting di¤erent from the eld setting but closer to
the assumptions of the theory. In contrast to the eld game, in the lab each player was
allowed to choose only one number, they could not use a random number generator, there
was only one prize per round, $7, and if there was no unique number nobody won.
In the eld data we do not know how much Swedish players learned each day about
the full distribution of numbers that were chosen. The numbers were available online and
partially reported on a TV show. To maintain parallelism with the eld, only the winning
number was announced in the lab.
Four laboratory sessions were conducted at the California Social Science Experimental
Laboratory (CASSEL) at the University of California Los Angeles on the 22nd and 25th
of March 2007, and on the 3rd of March 2009. The experiments were conducted using
the Zürich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments (zTree) developed by Urs
Fischbacher, as described in Fischbacher (2007). Within each session, 38 graduate and
undergraduate students were recruited, through CASSELs web-based recruiting system.
All subjects knew that their payo¤ will be determined by their performance. We made
no attempt to replicate the demographics of the eld data, which we unfortunately know
very little about. However, the players in the laboratory are likely to di¤er in terms of
gender, age and ethnicity compared to the Swedish players. In the four sessions, we had
slightly more male than female subjects, with the great majority clustered in the age
bracket of 18 to 22, and the majority spoke a second language. Half of the subjects had
never participated in any form of lottery before. Subjects had various levels of exposure
to game theory, but very few had seen or heard of a similar game prior to this experiment.
4.1 Experimental Procedure
At the beginning of each session, the experimenter rst explained the rules of the LUPI
game. The instructions were based on a version of the lottery form for the eld game
translated from Swedish to English (see Online Appendix D). Subjects were then given
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the option of leaving the experiment, in order to see how much self-selection inuences ex-
perimental generalizability. None of the recruited subjects chose to leave, which indicates
a limited role for self-selection (after recruitment and instruction).
In three of the four sessions, subjects were told that the experiment would end at a
predetermined, but non-disclosed time to avoid an end-game e¤ect (also matching the
eld setting, which ended abruptly and unexpectedly). Subjects were also told that
participation was randomly determined at the beginning of each round, with 26.9 subjects
participating on average. Subjects in the fourth session were explicitly told there were
49 rounds, and the number of players was drawn from a Poisson distribution. They
were also shown in the instructions a graph showing a distribution function for a Poisson
distribution with mean 26:9.
In the beginning of each round, subjects were informed whether they would actively
participate in the current round (i.e., if they had a chance to win). They were required
to submit a number in each round, even if they were not selected to participate. The
di¤erence between behavior of selected and non-selected players gives us some information
about the e¤ect of marginal incentives on performance (cf. Camerer and Hogarth, 1999).
When all subjects had submitted their chosen numbers, the lowest unique positive
integer was determined. If there was a lowest unique positive integer, the winner earned
$7; if no number was unique, no subject won. Each subject was privately informed,
immediately after each round, what the winning number was, whether they had won
that particular round, and their payo¤ so far during the experiment. This procedure was
repeated 49 times, with no practice rounds (as is the case of the eld). After the last
round, subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire which allowed us to build
the demographics of our subjects and a classication of strategies used. In two of the
sessions, we included the cognitive reection test as a way to measure cognitive ability
(to be described below). All sessions lasted for less than an hour, and subjects received
a show-up fee of $8 or $13 in addition to earnings from the experiment (which averaged
$8.60). Screenshots from the experiment are shown in Online Appendix D.
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4.2 Lab Descriptive Statistics
We focus only on the choices from incentivized subjects that were selected to actively
participate in the remainder of the paper. It is noteworthy, however, that the choices
of participating and non-participating subjects did not signicantly di¤er (p-value 0:66,
Mann-Whitney). The choices of participating subjects from the session with the an-
nounced Poisson distribution and the pooled other three sessions do not signicantly
di¤er at the ve percent level (p = 0:058, Mann-Whitney, p = 0:59 based on t-test with
clustered standard errors). In the remainder of the paper we therefore pool all four ses-
sions.
Figure 9 shows the data for the choices of participating players (together with the
Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction). There are very few numbers above 20 so the num-
bers 1 to 20 are the focus in subsequent graphs. In line with the eld data, players have a
slight predilection for certain numbers, while others are avoided. Judging from Figure 9,
subjects avoid some even numbers, especially 10, while they endorse the odd (and prime)
numbers 11, 13 and 17. Interestingly, only one subject played 20, while 19 was played ten
times and 21 was played seven times.
Table 4 shows some descriptive statistics for the participating subjects in the lab
experiment. As in the eld, some players in the rst week tend to pick very high numbers
(above 20) but the percentage shrinks by the seventh week. The average number chosen
in the last week corresponds closely to the equilibrium prediction (5.8 vs. 5.2) and the
medians are identical (5.0). Both the average winning numbers and the lowest unchosen
numbers are relatively close to the equilibrium prediction. The tendency to pick odd
numbers decreases over time 42 percent of all numbers are even in the rst week, whereas
49 percent are even in the last week. As in the eld data, the overwhelming impression
from Table 4 is that convergence to equilibrium is quite rapid over the 49 periods (despite
receiving feedback only about the winning number).
30
All rounds R. 1-7 R. 4349 Eq.
Avg. Std.dev. Min Max Avg. Avg. Avg.
Average number played 5.96 1.43 4.32 12.55 8.56 5.84 5.22
Median number played 4.65 1.03 3 10 6.14 5.00 5
First (25%) quartile 2.50 0.54 2 4 3.00 2.43 3
Third (75%) quartile 7.24 1.72 5 17 10.21 7.14 8
Below 20 (%) 98.02 2.77 81.98 100.00 93.94 98.42 100.00
Above T = 11 (%) 5.60 6.52 0 42.34 16.52 4.64 2.44
Even numbers (%) 45.19 4.47 35.16 53.47 42.11 49.15 46.86
Session 1
Winning number 6.02 9.38 1 67 13.00 2.50 5.22
Lowest number not played 8.08 2.57 1 12 4.86 8.14 8.44
Session 2
Winning number 5.07 2.59 1 10 5.83 5.14 5.22
Lowest number not played 7.47 2.96 1 12 6.29 8.43 8.44
Session 3
Winning number 5.61 3.26 1 14 6.14 5.67 5.22
Lowest number not played 7.53 2.68 2 13 7.43 10.00 8.44
Session 4 (Poisson)
Winning number 5.81 3.62 1 17 6.71 3.14 5.22
Lowest number not played 7.61 3.30 1 13 5.14 8.14 8.44
Summary statistics are based only on choices of subjects who are selected to participate. The
equilibrium column refers to what would result if all players played according to equilibrium (n = 26:9
and K = 99)
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for laboratory data
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4.3 Aggregate Results
In the Poisson equilibrium with 26.9 average number of players, strictly positive prob-
ability is put on numbers 1 to 16, while other numbers have probabilities numerically
indistinguishable from zero. Figure 10 shows the average frequencies played in week 1 to
7 together with the equilibrium prediction (dashed line) and the estimated week-by-week
results using the cognitive hierarchy model (solid line). These graphs clearly indicates
that learning is quicker in the laboratory than in the eld. Despite that the only feedback
given to players in each round is the winning number, behavior is remarkably close to equi-
librium already in the second week. However, we can also observe the same discrepancies
between the equilibrium prediction and observed behavior as in the eld. The distribution
of numbers is too spiky and there is overshooting of low numbers and undershooting at
numbers just below the equilibrium cuto¤ (at number 16).
Figure 10 also displays the estimates from a maximum likelihood estimation of the
cognitive hierarchy model presented in the previous section (solid line).29 In this esti-
mation, we use the estimated weekly  from the eld data and estimate  only.30 We
do not estimate both parameters since we are most likely over-tting by allowing two
free parameters to estimate relatively few choice probabilities.31 The cognitive hierarchy
model can account both for the spikes and the over- and undershooting. Table 5 shows
the estimated  parameter. There is no clear time trend in this parameter and the 
parameter moves around quite a lot over the weeks. We also estimate the precision para-
meter  while keeping the average number of thinking steps xed at 1:5, which has been
29To illustrate how the CH model behaves, consider N = 26:9 and K = 99, with  = 1:5 and  = 2.
Figure A6 (in the Online Appendix) shows how 0 to 5 step thinkers play LUPI and the predicted aggregate
frequency, summing across all thinking steps. In this example, 1-step thinkers put most probability on
number 1, 2-step thinkers put most probability on number 5, and 3step thinkers put most probability
on numbers 3 and 7.
30The alternative would be to x  and estimate  , but there is no way to tell what a reasonable
value of  is. The precision parameter  depends on scaling of payo¤s, the number of strategies etc and
can not be interpreted across games.
31When trying to estimate both parameters simultaneously, we found di¤erent estimates for di¤erent
grid sizes and initial values. Most estimates of  were between 6 and 12 and  were most often between
10 and 20 (apart from the rst week which always resulted in a  of 1:32). The log-likelihood is neither
smooth nor concave with xed  either, but with only one parameter to estimate we could use a very ne
grid to search for the best-tting parameter.
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shown to be a value of  that predicts experimental data well in a large number of games
(Camerer et al., 2004). The estimated precision parameter is in this case considerably
lower in the rst week, but is then relatively constant.32
Table 5 provides some goodness-of-t statistics for the cognitive hierarchy model and
the Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction. Consistent with results in the eld, the cog-
nitive hierarchy model ts data slightly better than the (parameter free) Poisson-Nash
equilibrium in most weeks. In particular, the 2 test rejects equilibrium for all 7 weeks,
but cannot reject the cognitive hierarchy model starting from week 3, even when we only
bin 2 numbers into one category.33 Similarly, based the proportion below the predicted
density, the equilibrium prediction does remarkably well, while the cognitive hierarchy
model does even better in all but the second and sixth weeks.34
The ENO results also conrm that equilibrium does pretty well starting from the
second week, while cognitive hierarchy always does better than equilibrium.
4.4 Individual Results
An advantage of the lab over the eld, in this case, is that the behavior of individual
subjects can be tracked over time and we can gather more information about them to link
to choices. Online Appendix D discusses some details of these analyses but we summarize
them here only briey.
In a post-experimental questionnaire, we asked people to state why they played as they
did. We coded their responses into four categories (sometimes with multiple categories):
32Figure A7 (in the Online Appendix) shows the tted cognitive hierarchy model when  is restricted
to 1:5. It is clear that the model with  = 1:5 can account for the undershooting also when the number
of thinking steps is xed, but it has di¢ culties in explaining the overshooting of low numbers. The main
problem is that with  = 1:5, there are too many zero-step thinkers that play all numbers between 1 and
99 with uniform probability. The log-likelihoods for the CH model with  = 1:5 range from -241 in week
1 to -212 in week 2, which are much worse than when using the eld values of  .
33We only use 6 bins (up to number 12) here to prevent the predicted number of observations to drop
below 5. Even if we do not bin numbers at all, the 2 test (up to number 12) yields similar results,
rejecting the equilibrium prediction for all weeks, and rejecting the cognitive hierarchy model for week 1,
2, 3, 6 and 7 (at the 5 percent level) and marginally for week 4 and 5 (at the 10 percent level).
34In Online Appendix B we calculate the log-likelihoods using data from numbers 1 to 16, which allows
us to compare the equilibrium prediction with cognitive hierarchy. Based on Schwarz (1978) information
criterion, the cognitive hierarchy model outperforms equilibrium in all weeks.
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Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Poisson-Nash equilibrium
2(for average frequency) 24.69 24.14 18.86 21.81 20.17 11.58 21.39
(Degree of freedom) ***(5) ***(5) ***(5) ***(5) ***(5) **(5) ***(5)
Proportion below (%) 82.25 88.55 87.61 88.64 88.64 92.86 87.06
ENO 158.5 202.5 173.2 239.5 244.1 844.4 200.3
Cognitive hierarchy model
Log-likelihood -210.4 -104.3 -88.6 -88.7 -87.5 -80.2 -99.4
 (from eld) 1.80 3.17 4.17 4.64 5.02 6.76 6.12
 1.26 5.97 16.89 5.59 5.28 22.69 4.52
2(for average frequency) 24.31 18.80 8.49 4.57 6.83 2.74 10.06
(Degree of freedom) ***(5) ***(5) (5) (5) (5) (5) *(5)
Proportion below (%) 84.62 87.44 90.52 92.54 92.42 91.11 91.07
ENO 296.0 263.3 466.8 4909.9 3475.8 894.7 502.9
Restricted cognitive hierarchy model
 ( = 1:5) 1.09 2.52 2.57 2.63 2.60 2.31 2.08
*=10 percent, **=5 percent and ***=1 percent signicance level.
The degree of freedom for a 2 test is the number of bins minus one.
The proportion below the theoretical prediction refers to the fraction of the empirical density that
lies below the theoretical prediction.
Table 5: Goodness-of-t for Poisson-Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy model for
laboratory data
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Random, stick (with one number), lucky, and strategic (explicitly mentioning
response to strategies of others). The four categories were coded 35%, 30%, 11% and
38% of the time. These categories had some relation to actual choices because stick
players chose fewer distinct numbers and lucky players had number choices with a
higher mean and higher variance. The only demographic variable with a signicant e¤ect
on choices and payo¤s was exposure to game theory; those subjects chose numbers
with less variation across rounds. A measure of cognitive reection(Frederick, 2005),
a short-form IQ test, did not correlate with choice measures or with payo¤s.
As is often seen in games with mixed equilibria, there is some mild evidence of puri-
cationsince subjects chose only 9.65 di¤erent numbers on average (see Online Appendix
D), compared to 10.9 expected in Poisson-Nash equilibrium.
All periods Week 1 Week 2 Week 3-7
Round (1-49) 0.001 -0.109 -0.065 0.023
(0.13) (-0.42) (-0.62) (1.58)
t  1 winner 0:178 0:148 0:304 0:059
(4.89) (2.38) (2.98) (1.89)
t  2 winner 0:133 0.096 0:242 0:038
(2.98) (1.18) (2.40) (1.68)
t  3 winner 0:083 0.052 -0.050 0.030
(1.94) (0.65) (-0.63) (1.18)
Fixed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4360 421 585 3354
R2 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.00
*=10 percent, **=5 percent and ***=1 percent signicance level.
The table report results from a linear subject xed e¤ects panel
regression. Only actively participating subjects are included.
t statistics based on clustered standard errors are within paren-
theses.
Table 6: Panel data regressions explaining individual number choices in the laboratory
In the post-experimental questionnaire, several subjects said that they responded to
previous winning numbers. To measure the strength of this learning e¤ect we regressed
players choices on the winning number in the three previous periods. Table 6 shows
that the winning numbers in previous rounds do a¤ect playerschoices early on, but this
tendency to respond to previous winning numbers is considerably weaker in later weeks
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(3 to 7). The small round-specic coe¢ cients in Table 6 also show that there does not
appear to be any general trend in playerschoices over the 49 rounds.
5 Conclusion
It is often di¢ cult to test game theory using eld data because equilibrium predictions
depend so sensitively on strategies, information and payo¤s, which are usually not observ-
able in the eld. This paper exploits an empirical opportunity to test game theory in a
eld setting which is simple enough that clear predictions apply (when some simplifying
assumptions are made). The game is a LUPI lottery, in which the lowest unique positive
integer wins a xed prize. LUPI is a close relative of auctions in which the lowest unique
bid wins.
One contribution of our paper is to characterize the Poisson-Nash equilibrium of the
LUPI game and analyze behavior in this game using both a eld data set, including more
than two million choices, and parallel laboratory experiments which are designed to rst
permit a clear test of the theory while also matching the eld setting. In both the eld
and lab, players quickly learn to play close to equilibrium, but there are some diagnostic
discrepancies between playersbehavior and equilibrium predictions.
As noted earlier, the variance in the number of players in the eld data is much larger
than the variance assumed in the Poisson-Nash equilibrium. So the eld data is not
an ideal test of this theory, strictly speaking. Therefore, the key issues are how much
the theorys predictions vary with changes in var(N), and how much behavior changes
in response to var(N). If either theory or behavior is insensitive to var(N), then the
Poisson-Nash equilibrium could be a useful approximation to the eld data.
As for theory: For the simple examples in which xed-N and Poisson equilibria can be
computed, zero variance (xed-N) and Poisson variance equilibria are almost exactly the
same (see Online Appendix A). In fact, as shown in Figure A1 (in the Online Appendix),
the equilibrium probabilities for the xed-N and Poisson-Nash equilibrium for the LUPI
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game played in the lab (n = 26:9 and K = 99) are practically indistinguishable. Keep
in mind that increasing var(N) (holding n constant) implies that sometimes there are a
lot of extra players so number choices should be higher, and sometimes there are fewer
players so number choices should be lower. These two opposing e¤ects could minimize
the e¤ect of variance on mean choices (as the low-K cases in Online Appendix A suggest
they do).
As for behavior: There are two sources of evidence that actual behavior is not too
sensitive to var(N). First, in the eld data the Sunday and Monday sessions have lower
n and lower standard deviation than all days, but choices are very comparable to data
from all days (in which var(N) about twice as large). Second, in the lab data di¤erent
sessions with var(N)  8 and var(N) = 27 lead to indistinguishable behavior.
These theoretical and behavioral considerations suggest why the wrongtheory (Poisson-
Nash) might approximate actual behavior surprisingly well in the eld (despite the eld
var(N) being empirically far from what the theory assumes).
A di¤erent way to describe our contribution is this: A LUPI game was actually played
in the eld, with specic rules. Can we produce any kind of theory which ts the data
from this game? In this view, it does not matter whether the eld setting matches the
predictions of a theory exactly. Instead, all that matters is whether the theory ts well,
even if its assumptions are wrong.
Here the answer is rather clear: The empirical distribution of choices clearly is moving
in the direction of the Poisson-Nash equilibrium over the 49 days (as judged by every
number choice statistic) and is numerically close. As a bonus, the CH model improves a
little on the Poisson-Nash equilibrium, when optimally parameterized, in the sense that
it can explain the key ways in which behavior departs from Poisson-Nash (too many low
and very high numbers) in the short run. The estimated number of thinking steps is in
the rst week 1.80, which is in line with estimates from many lab experiments.
Note that the point of the cognitive hierarchy model is not simply to t the data better
than Poisson-Nash, but also to show how people with limited computational power might
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start near, and converge to, such a complex equilibrium. However, the cognitive hierarchy
model provides merely suggestive evidence regarding this convergence, and hence, should
be viewed as a potential stepping stone (instead of the nal word) to an investigation
using a formal learning model.
Finally, because the LUPI eld game is simple, it is possible to do a lab experiment
that closely replicates the essential features of the eld setting (which most experiments
are not designed to do). This close lab-eld parallelism in design adds evidence to the
ongoing debate about when lab ndings generalize to parallel eld settings (e.g., Levitt
and List, 2007 and Falk and Heckman, 2009). The lab game was described very much like
the Swedish lottery (controlling context), experimental subjects were allowed to select
out of the experiment after it was described (allowing self-selection), and lab stakes were
made equal to the eld stakes (in expected terms). Basic lab and eld ndings are
fairly close: In both settings, choices are close to equilibrium, but there are too many
large numbers and too few agents choose intermediate numbers at the high end of the
equilibrium range. We interpret this as a good example of close lab-eld generalization,
when the lab environment is designed to be close to a particular eld environment.35
35Of course, it is also conceivable that there is a genuine lab-eld behavioral di¤erence but it is ap-
proximately canceled by di¤erences in the design details which have opposite e¤ects.
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Figure 1. Poisson-Nash equilibrium for the LUPI game (n=53,783, K=99,999). 
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Figure 2. Numbers chosen between 1900 and 2010, and between 1844 and 2066, during 
all days in the field. 
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Figure 3. Average daily frequencies and Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction for the 
first week in the field (n=53,783, K=99,999). 
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Figure 4. Average daily frequencies and Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction for week 
2-7 in the field (n=53,783, K=99,999). 
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Figure 5. Probability of choosing numbers 1 to 20 in symmetric QRE (n=26.9, K=99, λ 
=0.001,...,10) and in the Poisson-Nash equilibrium (n=26.9, K=99) 
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Figure 6. Probability of choosing numbers 1 to 10000 in the Poisson-Nash equilibrium 
and the cognitive hierarchy model (n=53,783, K=99,999). 
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Figure 7. Average daily frequencies, cognitive hierarchy (solid line) and Poisson-Nash 
equilibrium prediction (dashed line) for the first week in the field (n=53,783, K=99,999, 
τ=1.80, λ=0.0034). 
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Figure 8. Average daily frequencies, cognitive hierarchy (solid line) and Poisson-Nash 
equilibrium prediction (dashed line) for the last week in the field (n=53,783, K=99,999, 
τ=6.12, λ=0.0064). 
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Figure 9. Laboratory total frequencies and Poisson-Nash equilibrium prediction (all 
sessions, participating players only, n=26.9, K=99). 
 
 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 1 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 2 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 3 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 4 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 5 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 6 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
 
Week 7 Numbers chosen (truncated at 20) 
Figure 10. Average daily frequencies in the laboratory, Poisson-Nash equilibrium 
prediction (dashed lines) and estimated cognitive hierarchy (solid lines), week 1 to 7 
(n=26.9, K=99).  
 
 
 
